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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Programme on Eastern Europe
The Working Paper series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European Union 
in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of attention. The 
scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two areas of research 
have been prioritized:
1/The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme, as
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written for a meeting of the Reflection Group on the Long-Term 
Implications of Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: the Nature of the 
New Border, set up jointly by the Robert Schuman Centre and the Forward 
Studies Unit of the European Commission, and chaired by Professor Giuliano 
Amato. The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre are 
not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author. For 
information on this and other projects on Eastern Europe at the Robert Schuman 






















































































































































































As political and economic forces are driving the former communist states of 
Eastern Europe into the web of the European Union, several questions arise as to 
the cultural challenges that might ensue. Do East and West have different cultural 
sensibilities that will act as a roadblock to further integration? More particularly, 
do the Eastern applicant states have political cultures that encourage people to 
think about the relationship of religion to the individual, the relationship of 
nation to the state, or the relationship between minorities (ethnic, religious, racial 
or those based on sexual orientation) in ways incompatible with the political 
cultures of EU member states? More generally, have the separate paths of west 
and east over the course of history forged a cultural divide, foreshadowing 
extraordinary difficulties in political and economic cooperation in the future?
A "great schism" that divides the “Euro-Atlantic Community" from the 
“Euro-Asian Community” and traced back to the separation of Christianity into 
its Roman and Byzantine versions is commonly cited as a barrier to the real 
possibilities of the integration of the Eastern European states into the EU. It is 
hypothesized that asymmetries between East and West in regard to 
modernization have deepened the schism, and furthermore, since the end of 
World War II, “in the Western part of Europe historical values and traditions 
creating the base of the cultural and moral identity of the continent have been 
strengthened. In the Eastern regions of the continent, however, the strengthening 
of these values was hindered by the so-called socialist ideology, originating in 
the Western part of Europe, but in practice being connected with the Euro-Asian 
cultural sphere and being represented by the presence and practice of Soviet 
power”."
1--- 1
From my examination of cross country q ata transcending West and East in 
a few cultural realms — language J[reIigioni|[ and popular culture — I shall 
provide some preliminary answers tom e questions posed above.3 The data will 
show first that there exists a pan-European cosmopolitan culture that is rapidly 
infusing the applicant countries of the East. Second, the transcendent 
cosmopolitan European culture exists complementary with national cultures, 
which remain vibrant in the West and in the East, even in the context of an 
overarching continental culture. Third, the divergences of national cultures 
within the member states of the EU are considerable; yet on the cultural 
dimensions examined in this paper, the national cultures of the applicant states 
fall well within the extremes set by the member states. In fact, the data present a 
stunning result, which of course must be taken as preliminary and still at the level 
of speculation: viz., that the cultural patterns exhibited by respondents from the 



























































































EEC members than is the case for the post-six entrants. To the degree that there 
is a "catching up" process in the works, the data suggest it is occurring 
intergenerationally among the populations of the later entrants more so than the 
applicants, who are already closer to the so-called western European norm. 
Fourth, the interpretation provided herein for the stunning result that the cultural 
practices of the applicant states are more proximate to the cultural practices of 
the original six EEC members than are the cultural practices of the later entrants 
to those of the original six is that there is often a greater motivation for those on 
the far periphery to assimilate into the norms of the center than is the case for the 
populations close to the center. From this point, it is concluded that the 
incorporation of East European states into the EU. from a cultural point of view. 
has greater potential for the deepening of European integration than for its 
erosion.
More concretely, this paper demonstrates that the citizens of the applicant 
states from the East into the EU are moving towards full membership in what I 
have called the 2±1 cultural configuration of Europe.4 From this I mean that all 
Europeans who wish to participate fully in a wide range of mobility opportunities 
need to be conversant with an all-European continental culture. They must also 
be fully integrated into the national culture of the state in w hich they are citizens 
and/or reside, and will thereby maintain the vital differences in the so-called 
“mentalités” that differentiate intra-European national cultures. Thus all socially 
mobile Europeans will need to participate in two complementary cultural worlds. 
Those Europeans whose national cultures are close to the continental norm need 
only be a member of a single cultural world (2-1); while those Europeans living 
in “foreign” European states and those who live in regions of states with state- 
promoted regional cultures may need to be fully acquainted with three cultural 
worlds (2+1). All socially mobile Europeans will therefore have 2±1 cultural 
repertoires.
Taking language as the paradigm, in the emerging European quasi-state, 
all socially mobile Europeans must be fluent in what is becoming the continental 
language, English. They also must be fluent in the state language in which they 
live. Thus bilingualism (the “2” of 2±1) is becoming a European standard. 
Regional cultural groups within states are getting increasing recognition by both 
their central states and by the EU. To the extent that their regional governments 
can require the languages associated with those regions as media of instruction, 
or as necessary tools for regional government service, residents of those regions 
will be required to have a third language (2+1) in their repertoires. Those who 
live in the UK, where English is both the European and state language, need only 
be equipped in one (2-1) language. Immigrants from outside the EU as of now do 




























































































their families remain in the EU, are likely to have language repertoires consistent 
with the 2±1 scheme just outlined, depending upon where they live. The 
relationship of language to (quasi Estate in this regard is not one of a particular 
language to a state, but to a particular configuration of languages particular to a 
stater My suggestion in this paper is that across cultural domains, 
complementary 2±1 cultural repertoires are emerging from below , and that East 
Europe is becoming a part of this cultural configuration.
The purpose of this paper is in fact to explore this 2±1 configuration not 
only in language, but in religious belief and in two realms of popular culture. To 
the extent that the Eastern applicants are joining into this cultural configuration, 
we can project that the cultural barriers to political incorporation into the EU 
have been reduced.
Standing Against the Tide
There are three intuitions behind my theory of an emergent European 2±1 
cultural zone that includes both East and West. First, the embeddedment of 
Eastern European states into some European institutions is inevitable, even if EU 
membership is long delayed. It appears that the material benefits for becoming 
part of Europe and the opportunity costs for governments failing to bring their 
countries into the framework of Europe are so high that governments of virtually 
all political persuasions w ill see the institutional embeddedment w ithin Europe as 
unavoidable. Politics will concern the request for short-term exceptions from 
European institutional standards, and these politics will undoubtedly be intense, 
with socialist parties being the strongest advocates of states of exception. Yet 
inexorably, at least some East European states will become part of Europe's 
trans-national institutional nexus.
Second, authoritative institutions set the boundaries for cultural expression 
within the societies that live within those boundaries. As Susan Watkins has 
shown with impressive data, in the nineteenth century demographic patterns 
within Europe began to be explained far more adequately based upon the country 
of residence (where people lived under the same political institutions) than by the 
so-called cultural community within which a person identifies. Therefore, 
Spanish Basques were far closer to the Spanish mean than they were to a Basque 
mean, one which combined the Basque populations of France and Spain. Eugen 
Weber's and Abram de Swaan's separate analyses of language patterns in 19th 
century Europe show the same result. Cultural shift aligns with state institutions. 
And so the second element of my intuition: the more Eastern European states are 




























































































Third, the natural carriers of national cultures ought not be thought of as 
the dominant members of the core societies around which the nations were 
historically constructed. In fact, elite members of the core cultures will have an 
interest in altering cultural norms in order to avoid the demeaning consequences 
of becoming indistinguishable culturally from upwardly mobile imitators of their 
culture. Meanwhile, aggressive and ambitious members of peripheral societies, 
living under the authority of a dominant culture, will have an interest in 
mimicking that culture in order to secure positions of responsibility within it. To 
an important degree, then, it is the Eastern Europeans who have a stronger 
interest in a utopian vision of “Europe" as a well-defined (and easily mimicked) 
culture than culturally secure Europeans who are citizens of the West European 
states.
cultural norms toward the European standard.6
Despite the apparent (to me) cogency of these intuitions, powerful 
evidence firmly grounded in field and archival research stands against the thesis 1 
am propounding. Consider the perspective on Polish Catholicism provided by 
Maryjane Osa. She presents rich historical data to undermine the argument that 
the Church, because it stood on the right side of history in its opposition to 
communism, will lend support to the economic and political transformation that 
will bring Poland into the European world. In fact, she argues, the organization 
of the Polish church makes it all the more likely to become a supporter of a "new 
authoritarianism” in East Central Europe, where priests — and here she lends 
support to Jowitt's imagery — will be aligned with demagogues and colonels. 
She gives two reasons for her perspective. First, the church will be constrained 
organizationally in its search for social support, and will not easily be able to take 
political stands in the abstract, and ignore popular demands for social security 
whatever the constraints. Second, in a postcommunist void of social 
organizations, the hierarchy and ethos of the Church are (like its Leninist 
predecessor) against the secular individualism of the West. The Church, she 
fears, will be on the vanguard of reaction rather than in support of integration 
into West European culture.8
Consider next the argument of Katherine Verdery, whose field research is 
in Romania, another of the applicant states. Verdery has, to be sure, picked up 
the utopian vision of Europe articulated in Romania, as would be suggested by 
my third intuition. References to the former hegemon to the east in post- 
Ceaucescu Romanian discourse, she reports, exhibit fears of a renewed “Slavic 
imperialism” or getting sucked into “Bolshevist Asiatism”. Meanwhile European 
utopianists claim that proposed solutions to the problem of national minorities 




























































































level". This utopian discourse shows a greater confidence in “Europe" than 
would be exhibited by most sectors in Europe's core, which are far more subject 
to “Euro-skepticism" than is the periphery.
But Verdery claims that this utopian vision is an "urban intellectuals' 
concept”, one that is unconnected to village life. In the villages, she writes, a 
quite different story emerges, with a view of Europe that is infected by 
Ceau^escu's indigenist ideology that has a near fascist nation-discourse. The real 
electoral imperative in Romania. Verdery argues, is to win political support 
among the anti-Hungarians living in Transylvania, who are angered by the 
Hungarian population's demands for autonomy, and who are uninterested in 
merely receiving individual rights. Second, to many rural voters, “Europe" 
implies a disappearing social safety net. and the potential loss of communist-era 
pensions. Finally, Verdery emphasizes that increasingly that the then leading 
politicians in Romania, including President Ion Iliescu, were presenting a vision 
of Europe as filled with “nationalized states", something that Romania must 
accomplish before joining into a wider Europe. This would naturally involve a 
form of national cleansing. Verdery fears. And this explains why in 1993. 
Romania sent a delegation to Strasbourg, personally appointed by the President, 
for talks on joining the Council of Europe, that was filled with anti-Europeanists. 
While Europe is moving in a liberal direction, the implication of Verdery's 
sensitive analysis is that Romania is moving not toward a European utopia, but 
rather toward a political culture of anti-liberalism and intolerance.1’
It would be foolhardy indeed to dismiss these two cogent — and 
thematically similar10 — treatises. Yet. as I believe the data will show in the 
subsequent three sections, when compared to the “real” Europe, the "applicant” 
Europe does not look like it has been submerged in a half century of anti-liberal 
Leninism. To be sure, the Polish Church and Romanian political parties are 
examples of illiberal institutions. But from the level of culture taken here, the 
populations of the East European applicant states look very much to be part of an 
emerging continental European culture; and the younger generation living in 
those states is quickly becoming part of it. In fact, the very division of Europe 
into “East" and "West" seems from the viewpoint of the data that 1 shall present 
to be defunct, a product of the Cold War." Future research will have to reconcile 
the findings of Osa1'  and Verdery with those presented here; but 1 believe that 
Osa and Verdery might well have idealized western Europe a bit too much, 
making the illiberal strands they saw so clearly in Eastern Europe look un- 
European. They may also have missed some of the broader institutional 





























































































Although it is not publicly acknowledged, a 2±1 language configuration is 
consolidating itself in Western Europe. Businessmen, students and Eurocrats — 
virtually anyone who sees a career in a European context — must know English. 
Although French is the language of the European Court and it is still a preferred 
language in several European institutions housed in Brussels and Strasbourg, no 
language other than English has a claim as an all-European lingua franca. 
Meanw'hile. state bureaucracies and school systems operate through state 
languages as media of instruction in virtually all public schools: it is not possible 
to survive economically or to communicate w'ith state officials in any European 
state without speaking the state language. Finally, regionally based groups (with 
the Catalans in the lead, but the Basques, the Welsh, and the Oc-speakers 
following) are making similar demands upon their residents, as educational texts, 
government memos, and public pronouncements are increasingly written in 
regional languages. The resulting 2±1 configuration is an equilibrium because no 
party to it (state governments: regional activists; the European Commission; 
socially mobile Europeans) has an interest in deviating from it (though the 
French government is a partial exception). It is a self-enforcing bottom-up 
solution to a linguistically-posed coordination problem.
Will the East European states become part of this language configuration? 
The data from the ISSP surveys, with the sample including three members of the 
original EEC (West Germany. Italy, and Netherlands), six members of the 
expanded EC (Austria, Ireland, UK, Spain. Sweden and East Germany), and 
seven applicant countries (Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia. Slovenia, 
Bulgaria and Hungary) suggest that the answer is “yes”.13 Respondents in 
virtually all the countries overwhelmingly report that the titular language of the 
country (that is, the language after which the state is named) is their home 
language. In this sense, all member states (with some limited exceptions) and 
applicants are “nation”-states in the sense of having coordinated on a single 
language for home life. Exceptions include Latvia where only 63.8 percent speak 
Latvian as their principal home language (the rest mostly speaking Russian) and 
Spain, where 80.7 percent claim Spanish as their first language and only 1.3 
percent more claim to speak Spanish fluently. My guess is that the 210 
respondents who claimed Basque, Galician or Catalan as their first home 
language but did not report Spanish as a language they knew well were giving 
surveyors political rather than linguistic knowledge! In any case, in none of the 
countries in the survey is there any evidence of a less than dominant role of the 
state language as the principal language of home life.




























































































Second, the role of English as a lingua franca throughout Europe is 
becoming a fact of life. Concerning fluency in the three contenders for a 
European lingua franca among the original EEC members: 29.8 percent overall 
claim fluency in English: 52.7 percent in German: and 11.3 percent in French 
(but note well, neither French nor Belgium was part of the sample). But the data 
on second language learning is more telling. Among these same original EEC 
members, 29.7 percent speak English as a supplementary language, while only 
6.8 percent speak German as a supplementary language, and 11.2 percent speak 
French. This suggests that although German had the most first language speakers 
of the original EEC. English amongst this set has become the preferred second 
language of respondents. In the later generations of EG members (in which 
English as supplementary language is reduced substantially, as the UK and 
Ireland are two members of the sample), 7.4 percent speak English as a 
supplementary language, 1.5 percent speak German and 4.4 percent speak 
French. Among the applicant countries, German (with 8.6 percent) outpaces 
English (with 5.7 percent), but French has merely 1.0 percent. Among those 
under 35 years of age in the applicant countries, how'ever, 11.7 percent claim 
fluency in English as a supplementary language whereas only 10.6 percent claim 
that for German. Two points are clear. First is that French may have ideological 
appeal to some; in reality, it is not a language of wider communication outside of 
a few corridors of pow'er in Brussels and Strasbourg. Second. English has already 
become or is becoming the widespread second language of choice in all three sets 
of countries. It is the language of wider communication in all of Europe.
The outlier cases concerning the multilingual repertoires of Europe are not 
among the applicants, but rather among the additional members after the original 
six. As can be seen from Table A, the respondents from the later members are far 
more likely to report being monolingual than respondents from the countries 
from the other two groups. This isn't just due to the UK and to Ireland, which 
given the 2±1 configuration, ought to be monolingual. But consider Spain, where 
nearly 79.2 percent of the population reports being monolingual, and over 99 
percent of the multilinguals report speaking another language of Spain (Catalan, 
Galician, Basque, or Castilian) as their second language. Even taking UK and 
Ireland out of the sample, later members have 74.6 percent monolinguals, 
considerably higher than in the original entrants yet slightly lower than the 
respondents from the applicant states. Therefore, if there is a non-cosmopolitan 
outlier set for this part of the language configuration, it is the later entrants rather 





























































































East Europe and the Religious Beliefs of its Citizens
In 1991. ISSP sponsored an earlier study, with a somewhat different sample of 
countries, that focused on religion and religious belief. Among the original six. 
West German) . Netherlands and Italy were included. Among the later entrants, 
samples from Great Britain. Northern Ireland. Ireland, and Austria are included 
in the data base. Among the applicant countries, there was Hungary. Slovenia, 
Poland and (with a different coding for 1991 than it received in 1995) East 
Germany.14 The data also show what was indicated in the national identity survey 
about language: viz., that there is a greater level of common cosmopolitanism, 
multilingualism, and here secularism among the original members and present 
applicants than there is among the later members. If there is an intergenerational 
trend, it is towards the later members catching up to the secularism of the original 
members and the present applicants.
The findings should be no surprise once it is recognized that the Ireland 
and Northern Ireland samples are extremely religious (on most questions more so 
than the Poles), while the East Germans and Hungarians are extremely secular. 
Consider the question (v26) of whether those w'ho do not believe in god are unfit 
for public office. Of the country samples, the two highest scores are among the 
later entrants. Ireland and Northern Ireland where 22.7 percent and 29.6 percent 
respectively either agreed or strongly agreed. Among the two lowest scores are 
Netherlands (3.6 percent) and East Germany (3.9 percent). On the question of 
respondents’ belief in the Devil (v35) again the highest scores were from Ireland 
(48.6 percent) and Northern Ireland (68.1 percent), and the lowest both from the 
applicant states. East Germany (6.5 percent) and Hungary (11.3 percent). On the 
question of respondents’ beliefs about heaven (v36). 90.3 percent of the Northern 
Ireland respondents and 87.2 percent of those from Ireland answered that there is 
definitely or probably a heaven. Compare this with the five lowest scores: 20.1 
percent in East Germany, 28.2 percent in Hungary, 40 percent in Netherlands, 
42.3 percent in Slovakia, and 42.7 percent in West Germany. Meanwhile, all four 
of the later entrants are among the six countries with the highest percentages — 
after the two Irelands, Great Britain as 54.3 percent and Austria 45.9 percent.
I then took five questions that examined the degree to which religious 
criteria should play a role in public authority. The questions are: (l)Whether R 
agrees that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for pubic office (v26): 
(2)Whether R agrees that religious leaders should have no influence on how 
people vote in elections (v27); (3)Whether R agrees that there ought to be more 
people with religious beliefs in public office (v28); (4)Whether R agrees that 
religious leaders ought to have no influence in government decisions (v29); and 




























































































Each of the answers were on a five-point scale, and I recoded them so that a 5 
represented views that government ought to be highly influenced by religious 
values and leaders, and a 1 represented views that government ought not be so 
influenced. I divided the sum of the five answers by five, giving an index ranging 
from one to five. 1 then weighted the sample such that there were the same 
percentage of respondents for each country, based on country population.
1 then (again with the weighted sample) ran a regression model with the 
index for religious influence in governmental affairs as the dependent variable. 1 
controlled for age. for whether the mother of the respondent were a Roman 
Catholic, respondent's sex, level of education, and then dummies for each of the 
three stages of membership in the EU. The model on Table B shows the results 
of an equation that enters both the applicant and later dummies, which in effect 
compares each of them with the original members. The result shows that the 
average respondent from a later entrant country will have a score on the religious 
power index that is twice as far (in the more religious sense) from the average 
respondent from an original member country than the average respondent from 
an applicant country.
Table C shows these differences as comparative means. Here we see the 
differences among the three categories of states: and as well for two sub- 
populations — those under 35 years old and those 35 years or older. The final 
column shows that from an intergenerational point of view, it is the young 
populations of the later entrants who are moving more quickly to the religious 
culture of the original six than the young populations in the applicant states. One 
might interpret these data as showing that the later entrants adjusted culturally 
from one generation to the next in light of EU membership; but that such a 
cultural shift is not as necessary for the populations of the present applicant 
countries.
I recoded the list of religions — as the ISSP study differentiated among 29 
religious denominations — to a list of five: (1) Catholic, (2) National Christian 
Church, (3) Protestants and those who called themselves Christians with no 
denomination, (4) Non-Christian and (5) No religion. Tables D and E present 
data on correlation coefficients among respondents' reports of religious 
affiliations of themselves (themselves as children) and close family members. No 
clear trends emerge, but there are two interesting results. First, rather surprisingly 
on two measures, religious similarity of mother and father, and religious 
similarity of respondent and spouse, the respondents in the later entrant countries 
show a far more cosmopolitan bent than either the respondents from the original 
six or from the applicant countries. Since on other measures, the later entrants 




























































































factor when it comes to culture. Second, there is a vast difference among 
respondents from the applicant countries in reporting their religion as a child and 
their current religious affiliation. Reports on religion as a child suggests that 
under communist rule, there was little attention to religious membership in 
family life. Reports on the current religion of the respondent suggests that after 
the fall of communism, people began to accept their ascribed religious labels as 
part of their identity, even if they report being atheists, and marry within their 
ascribed groups. In fact, there is far greater religious endogamy (computed as in 
Table E rather than the low level as computed in Table D) among the respondent 
populations of the applicant states than the other two sets.
Several participants in the “Forward Studies Unit" conference pointed out 
that the same levels of secularization indicated by the data have vastly different 
meanings in the West and the East, as the East did not experience the history of 
the Enlightenment, nor was its secularization the cumulative impact of individual 
agnosticism. Rather the secularization in the East was due to intense religious 
delegitimization by the agents of Soviet communism. My data do not allow me to 
reject this interpretation. But I do wonder how the Soviet rulers could have been 
so successful in achieving secularization from above when they could not instill 
socialist values from above? My priors are to accept East European 
secularization as individual and reflective of the same Enlightenment processes 
that pushed citizens in the original six toward secular, cosmopolitan world views.
Overall, then, the religious surveys point to an Eastern Europe that is quite 
close to the norms of the original EEC members in regards to beliefs and values 
concerning the role of religion in public life. And they are closer in fact than 
respondents from the later entrants, and now members of the EU. It would be 
difficult, with these data on the table, to argue that there are religious cultures in 
Eastern Europe that are reinforced by the hierarchical values of Leninism, and 
which support anti-liberal values.
It would be highly speculative, but I would suggest the data are consistent 
with my cultural configuration notion of the emergent European quasi-state. 
There is an emerging secular religious culture throughout Europe, one that sees 
religion as inconsequential for political life. There is complementary with this 
secular religious culture a high level of membership in and identification with 
nationally based churches, within which there is considerable endogamy. Thus 
two religious cultures are in simultaneous existence within many European 
respondents^ There are of course many minorities who develop separate religious 
traditions alongside the secularization of Europe and possible connection to the 
national churches, making for a 2+1 religious culture. By this I mean that most 




























































































well as by an identity connected with the church associated with the dominant 
population (the 2 religion formula). Religious minorities will be affected by both 
these religious traditions, but will be free to participate in rituals of their own 
religion (2+1). Of course, there will remain a class of true secular cosmopolitans, 
with no connection to any national church (2-1). This multiple religious 
configuration. 1 would suggest, is in equilibrium, not in tension with itself, and 
reflective of both West and East.
East Europe and Popular Culture
Popular culture (here film and music) has two profiles. On the one side, its 
products are industrial commodities pervading markets all over the world, no 
different from detergents. On the other side, its products help reproduce local, 
national and/or transnational cultures. The French government seeks to compete 
with "Titanic” the movie and "Tide” the detergent for an overlapping set of 
reasons. One reason why they want to respond to the former (and not a reason to 
respond to the latter) is a fear that a globalized artistic industry would reduce the 
symbolic space that encompasses "Frenchness”. In any event, thinking of its 
cultural profile, the data on film and music, faux de mieu.x. show Eastern Europe 
and members of the ELI to be part of a common global regime, in film dominated 
by United States' production and distribution hegemony, and in popular music by 
a West European/North American duopoly.
Film
In the film industry, hegemony is found in Hollywood. Consider Table F, on the 
“top ten” films in four recent years reported from four of the original six 
(Germany, Netherlands, France and Italy), two of the later entrants (UK and 
Spain) and four applicant states (Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia). The 
first remarkable fact is that in none of these ten countries, and in all four sample 
years, are fewer than half of the "top ten” US productions. There are a few 
reasons why all Europeans are attracted to the same internationalist movie 
culture. First, big-budget U.S. films are better produced and technically superior, 
for example with respect to special effects and animation, and thereby attract 
wide audiences throughout the world. Second, the European film industries are 
poorly funded, save for UK, Spain, Italy and France. In the Eastern European 
countries, the political and economic turmoil in the past decade vastly reduced 
the production of films. Thus there has been no serious “European” alternative, 
though the figures for 1997 suggest a counter-trend. Third, some of the best 
European directors are being attracted to Hollywood, and help produce American 




























































































networks, from producers to theaters, and this system is now fully dominated by 
a handful of massive distribution chains, all with close ties to the Hollywood 
majors. In Spain, for example, ninety-six domestic feature films were produced 
in 1996. and film attendance is rising. Yet only thirty-eight of the ninety-six 
domestic films, due to lack of a local distributor, received at least one public 
showing. The enormous new growth of multiplex theaters in Europe (with 120 in 
Spain: 40 in Germany; 25 in Netherlands, and 98 in the UK in 1997) plays into 
the hands of the distributional giants. Despite the enormous growth of screens, by 
putting the best screens under control of the giants, the result may actually lower 
the chances for a screening of domestic films.
A second fact illustrated by Table F, perhaps even more astonishing than 
the first, is that in none of the countries does any film produced outside of the 
U.S. or Europe make it into the “top ten". This means that Russian. Australian. 
Hong Kong, and Indian films (with the latter two having extraordinarily large 
film industries) did not penetrate into the upper levels of box office success 
among the member countries of the original six, the later entrants, or the 
applicant states. The cultural influence of films from these countries has been 
negligible in the realm of European popular culture.
A third important fact that comes out from Table F is the relative weakness 
of European films outside their home countries. In the data from 1992, 1995 and 
1996, not one European film made it to the “top ten" in another European 
country. The data from 1997 suggest that a pan-European audience for European 
films is perhaps emerging. The leading film for 1997 in all countries of the 
sample was "Mr. Bean", based on a BBC TV series that is in the genre of 
comedic pantomime. This film did not make it into the US "top ten", suggesting 
at least some autonomy of European movie tastes from Hollywood blockbusters. 
Overall, the West European film industry, notably in Netherlands and Germany, 
has achieved somewhat of a renaissance in the late 1990s, as young film 
directors, often working through film divisions of state owned TV networks, 
have made more films that speak to issues that affect young people. European 
joint ventures is a related route toward competition with America. From 1993 to 
1996, for example, Latvia had not produced a feature film, and its market is 
heavily dominated by US productions. The first new film in 1996 is a co­
production with a West European consortium .Joint ventures with the US 
industry is another route to quasi-autonomy. One of the European productions in 
1997 that made it to three “top tens” outside of its France, where it was produced, 
was “La Femme Nikita”. This was a joint French/U.S. production in reality 
(distributed in the US under the name “The Fifth Element”) and it starred the 




























































































Another (albeit small) spark to the European film industry is “Euroimages" 
formed under the aegis of the Council of Europe in 1988. Since its creation, with 
a mean support figure of about 12 percent of budget. Euroimages has co­
produced some 460 feature films and documentaries. Presently, all six of the 
original EEC members are members of Euroimages. eight later members 
(Austria. Finland. Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal. Spain, and Sweden, with 
UK recently leaving), and six applicant countries (Bulgaria. Czech Republic. 
Hungary, Poland Romania, and Slovakia).16 It seems clear that to the extent that 
there is competition vis-à-vis the American film industry in both West and East 
Europe, it will be films from Europe itself (and virtually nowhere else) that will 
move into a second position in domestic markets.
A fourth fact that comes out from analysis of Table F is that the applicant 
states share with the rest of Europe a common movie culture. The dominance of 
American films has been clear. Until 1997. in fact, there was only one film that 
was not American in the four applicant states. This was “Priest'’, produced in the 
UK, which Variety described as "an absolutely riveting. made-for-BBC slice-of- 
life drama that’s a controversial look at incest, gay-life and the Catholic Church". 
The movie was seen by approximately 430.000 Poles and generated just under a 
million US dollars in revenue. As with the rest of Europe, the applicant states had 
only fledgling domestic products. Also, as with the rest of Europe, the popularity 
of films made in other European countries (outside of “Priest") appears only in 
1997. Most interesting, given the so-called legacy of the socialist past, among 
applicant states there were no non-American or non-European films to make it on 
to any “top ten” list.
Thus, one might say there is a European 2±1 film regime in early stages of 
development: American films dominate throughout Europe; some state film 
industries are either strong (as in France and Italy) or re-emerging (Germany, 
UK. Poland) which will represent an alternative film culture. Finally (and this 
component is different from the language regime), trans-state European films are 
developing their own markets within the EU and outside their national borders. 
Outside of American films, only European films seem to have the power to 
capture a limited share of trans-European markets. All other national film 
industries (and film industries from the regions within European states) will play 
only to boutique markets. In this sense, both West and East Europe are part of the 
same film culture.
Popular Music
In the world of popular music, the applicant states to the EU are part of a global 




























































































language internationalist popular music is the dominant seller. Each country has 
its own national version of international pop that sells well domestically. Finally. 
European countries sell their top records to consumers in other European 
countries. The data will show that the applicant states to the EU are very much 
part of this configuration.
The international music business today is one in which the United States 
and five EU countries share a duopoly. Three major EU companies (Thorn EMI 
in the United Kingdom; PolyGram in Netherlands; and BMG in Germany) 
account for about 40 percent of the world market in sales, on par with sales from 
U.S. companies. In many respects. West European youth culture has begun to 
surpass the Americans in setting standards for musical trends. The result is a 
powerful global pop music culture that pervades Western Europe. In Eastern 
Europe especially, but in Western Europe as well, there are three musical 
cultures: first, the global pop music culture that arrives in the Eastern European 
states with a marked time delay; second, the remnants of national pop music 
cultures that have not been entirely erased by the global market: and finally, a 
healthy market of European pop that sells quite well throughout the EU and 
Eastern Europe. Therefore one could call the European pop culture configuration 
a 2±1 outcome (as UK's English language pop is both titular and pan-European).
Popular music has become so global in the past generation that the national 
origin of popular music and the artists who produce it are blurred and difficult to 
code. In the early post-World War II generation, Americanization was clear.1 
Radio Luxembourg (as well as the US Armed Forces Radio Network) brought 
American rock and roll to Europe in the 1950s. The 1960s-70s saw the supposed 
“Americanization of youth culture”. In fact, the so-called “British Invasion of 
America” was really a moment of recognition in the UK that their artists' true 
market was in the US, and contracts with US recording companies the criterion 
of success.
But a European disco culture grew from semi-obscurity to world 
dominance from the 1970s through the 1990s. In the early 1970s, a genre of 
“Euro Pop” — a combination of Eurovision song contest entries and the disco- 
dance sound from holiday dance clubs in Ibiza — began to develop on its own, 
outside of American direct influence. ABBA, a Swedish disco act, went beyond 
the confines of Europe, and brought this chirpy singalong music to international 
audiences. As the genre developed, it hit the gay disco scene, and influenced the 
German/Italian disco sound that was called “Eurobeat” in which high quality 
technology gave the music a sheen that assured club and radio play. With the 
American disco scene fading away, British companies began producing not for 




























































































The marriage of Britain to Europe made Europe a genuine challenger to the US 
for the definition of an international youth music.
The "international pop” that constitutes the first part of the 2± 1 formula is 
largely English in language (as would be expected from the data on language 
use) but multicultural in form. A significant proportion of EU hits originate in 
UK and Ireland, but even those originating from Germany, the Netherlands. 
Sweden. Austria and Denmark (and sometimes Spain as well) feature English 
titles and texts. While most of the lyrics for these songs are so primitive that it 
seems generous to call it "language”, the words tend to be English ones. In Table 
G, we see that in ten selected countries for 1999. only in France (and of course 
UK) do a majority of titles in the "top twenty” appear in the titular language. For 
1999, taking the mean percentage of original six countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, France and Italy— where only the "top ten”, not "top tw'enty". are 
recorded), later members (only Spain, as in UK the titular language and English 
are the same), and applicants (Hungary', Latvia, Poland and Slovakia—w'here 
only 1998 data are available) reveals an already familiar pattern. The mean figure 
is 73.75 percent of English language titles for the original six and 70 percent for 
the later member (here only Spain). Thus the mean figure for the applicant states 
(at 75 percent) shows closer connection to the original six than does the figure 
for the later member. As a rule, foreign language titles, other than English, rarely 
make it into individual country charts, the figure never going over 10 percent. In 
a data base going back to 1992 (not shown), occasionally a German language 
title hits the Netherlands' charts, or a Portuguese song the Spanish, or a French 
and/or Italian song receives general European interest. For example, in 1998, a 
Russian song appeared successfully in the Latvian charts. But in general, outside 
of English, foreign language titles do not reach the top of the popular music 
charts in the European cultural configuration.
The dominance of the English language is attenuated by attempts to 
cultivate a sexy multicultural image. A good example of this is Sash!, a German 
disc jockey (Sascha Lappessen) who employs various vocalists to sing in 
different European languages. He has had five “top five” hits from 1997-98 
(“Encore un Fois”, “Ecuador”, “Stay”, “La Primavera” and “Mysterious Times”) 
with titles in three languages, none of them German. In the February 1999 listing 
of the “top ten” or “top twenty” from the nine countries for which we have data, 
there were 170 different titles, but of the twenty-two that appear on the lists of 
more than one country, only one of these titles was not in English.
The second part of the expression 2±1 refers to music that plays mostly, or 
primarily, to domestic audiences. For example, the EU Industry Guide of 1995 




























































































pop.” Domestic artists for domestic audiences contribute around 30 percent. 
Classical recordings account for the final 10 percent. In Greece. Italy and France, 
the second category — domestic pop — is somewhat stronger, accounting for 
40-60 percent of the markets. In regard to language, as we saw on Table G. 
titular language songs have a grip in virtually all the European markets, with 
France. Poland, Spain, Hungary and (of course UK) being the strongest. On the 
charts of "top twenty” for February 1999. there are ten songs with French titles: 
but in no other country besides France are these songs in the "top twenty". 
Although some of these songs are from a French Canadian popular musical then 
playing in Paris and from French-singing North Africans, it is fair to say that 
while English language songs play internationally. French language songs play 
well only in Francophone countries.
Table H paints a complementary picture, and one that helps draw' out the 
pan-European aspect of the 2±1 configuration. It computes the percentage of the 
"top twenty” for 1999 by country' in w'hich the song was produced. Unlike the 
case of film, every country in the sample (with Italy the major exception) has a 
marked national presence in the top sellers. Also unlike film. EU productions sell 
widely beyond their national boundaries, and complete successfully with 
American productions. Taking the means of the three sets of countries in the 
samples, we see that for the percentage of “top twenty” hits that are of domestic 
(national) origin, of the original six, the mean figure is 17.5, and for the later 
members it is also 17.5, with the applicants at 23.75. And showing the greatest 
pan-European support, the applicants have the highest percentage of other EU at 
27.5 percent, with the original six having a mean percentage of 12.5 and the later 
members a mean percentage of 15. It is clear from these data that the Eastern 
European applicant states included in this sample are very much part of the 2±1 
music configuration that marks the countries already members of the European 
Union.
Is This All There Is To Culture?
One might object and ask whether language repertoires, beliefs about the 
political relevance of religion and popular exposure to movies and music are all 
there is to “culture”, or whether the data I present here are indicators of “culture” 
at all?
Consider my discussion concerning language repertoires. Two questions 
about the interpretation of these data speak to the core concerns of this paper. 
First, is the 2±1 configuration in any way unique to Europe, or is it a function of 




























































































elements of globalization that are reflected in the European configuration (e.g. 
the dominance of English is a global phenomenon), the specificity of the 
repertoires is distinctly European. Consider the following cases. Germans 
working in France will expect their children to have a sound education in 
German (as well as English and French), yet Algerians working in France will 
regard Arabic as a language of the home, and not a language of instruction in 
their schools. This is so because German is a language of Europe but not Arabic. 
The concessions given to Catalan in the EU rather quickly get incorporated into 
political programs in other minority language regions, on a premise that all 
European regions have equal rights to full cultural expression. It is the case that 
2± 1 repertoires may become more common in other regions of the world, and no 
doubt English will continue to play a larger role: but the elements of these 
configurations will differ across regions. In this sense the European configuration 
will be unique.
Second, to w hat extent do languages used for specific domains represent 
something ‘'cultural’' and not just functional? To address this question, 1 shall 
make an analogy between changing one's language repertoire with religious 
conversion. As demonstrated by Nock, religious converts almost never imbibe 
the cultural ethos of the religion; rather they take advantage of the instrumental 
benefits that accrue to "believers" of their adopted religion. It is only in 
successive generations, when for example the children of converts get educated 
at the hands of the religious virtuosi, that a cultural shift takes place.IS This 
mechanism could well operate with language repertoires. In the present 
generation of Languedocians born after World War II, reliance on English may 
be thought of as purely functional, and reliance on Occitan may be purely 
recreational. But their children may well see this multilingual repertoire as 
constitutive of their identities (combining the cosmopolitan and the local, in a 
unique way), and appeal to it with pride. To the extent that a language repertoire 
becomes constitutive of social identities, it is properly conceived of as cultural. 
And so, my data cannot demonstrate that the emerging 2±1 European repertoire 
is a fully developed aspect of culture; but intergenerationally, it is likely to 
become one.
But even if the three realms I have analyzed are cultural, and even if my 
interpretation of the long term implications of the data are correct, are there not 
other, perhaps "deeper” elements of culture that divide East from West? Ralph 
Dahrendorf raised this issue in a poignant way when an earlier version of this 
paper was presented to the European Committee of Reflection in September 
1998. In particular, he asked, would readership of books and newspapers, as 
opposed to films and music, show the same global culture? He thought not, as 




























































































there is in the heart of Europe a common element or value, one that respects the 
rule of law. carries with it a desire for social democracy and reflects "a 
combination of a desire to be a successful part of the global economy, but to also 
conduct policies that favor cohesion and justice." This value is not (now) shared 
in the East, he fears, and he sees this as ominous for the EU should its core 
values be diluted by too-quick entry of the applicant states into the EU.
On Dahrendorf s first point, it might be noted that what constitutes "real" 
or "deep" culture cannot so easily be discerned. Worse, looking ever deeper for 
culture subverts any attempt at the systematic analysis of the effects of culture. 
This is so because if we have an intuition that X's and Y’s are different in a deep 
way, any evidence that they share cultural traits will be written off as "shallow." 
Since it is always possible to dig a bit deeper, the intuition cannot be 
scientifically undermined. All I can claim for the data presented here is that 
evidence of a cultural divide between members of the EU and applicants from the 
East is lacking in three domains of culture. Those who wish to examine other 
realms are welcome to do so; and if they find a cultural divide between East and 
West, as might have been expected from the research of Verdery and Osa. my 
findings here would need to be revised. But as yet there are no systematic data, 
only vague impressions, that stand against my claims herein.
Dahrendorf also claims that in political culture, those in the East may not 
have the same social democratic values and concern for the rule of law as do the 
populations of nearly all of the present members of the EU. This may well be 
true, but trivially so. This paper has postulated a range of cultural variables as 
independent, and asked whether different values on these variables for new 
members would negatively impact the common political venture of the EU, 
which is the dependent variable. But if you want to collect data on "respect for 
the rule of law” or "the value of social democracy", you need to observe political 
behavior, which is more-or-less the same information that will inform the 
dependent variable. Dahrendorfs claim therefore verges on tautology. His thesis 
in caricature is that there would be a clash of political values were the eastern 
applicant states admitted into the EU because they have different political values. 
My thesis is that if the applicant states fail to integrate into the European political 
community, it would not be because of cultural difference.
My suspicion is that the thesis of cultural difference is a canard, upheld by 
concerned citizens and political leaders who fear, for other reasons, the 
consequences of joining East to West. It may be the case that for other reasons — 
economic differentials, noninsthutionalized systems of justice, nonconsolidation 
of democratic elections — the attempted integration of eastern Europe into the 




























































































differences the costs would be any heavier than the incorporation of Britain. 
Ireland, Austria and the other later entries. And 1 have presented here some 
positive evidence that those costs might be lighter than the incorporation of the 
already integrated later entrants.
Implications for a Deepening of the EU
In this paper. I have made three claims, and provided data from three cultural 
realms to give support for these claims, all of which are in some tension with 
popular understanding of the dynamics of the deepening of the EU and of the 
implications of Eastern European incorporation into the EU for that deepening.
The first claim is that despite the still and ever-vibrant national cultures 
that constitute the member states (and associated nationalities) of the EU. there is 
an emergent cultural configuration in Europe that represents a common cultural 
(and proto-national) zone. Although there is significant cultural diversity 
between nations and between states within Europe, that diversity is contained 
within a coherent cultural system, such that most Europeans have a set of cultural 
repertoires that enables them to act appropriately (i.e. according to local 
standards) throughout the EU. For language, there is an emerging lingua franca, a 
continued vibrancy of state languages, and a subsidized system to protect 
minority languages. The norms for which languages are to be used in which 
contexts are well internalized. It is the internalized norms of the cultural system 
that constitutes the common cultural zone. In religion, thereJi^m-EU--wide''I -■ "*•
consensus in support of a secular Christianity, a respect for national churches that- 
do not’ meddle in political life, and a recognition as well of minority religious 
groups as long as the religious expression of these groups is contained within that 
community. In popular culture, Europe participates in an international popular 
tlinTlmd" music system (the latter in which it is a duopoly producer) that is 
dominant in each realm, but each has a small but viable national production of 
film and music that is made for domestic audiences and for other Europeans. 
Europeans therefore have a common matrix for the production and consumption 
of popular culture.
The second claim is that the applicant states from Eastern Europe are far 
closer to the European cultural system than is popularly understood, or even 
recognized by leading social scientists who have observed the cultural life of 
these states with great perspicacity. In fact, the preliminary data show — much to 
my amazement — that in the cultural realms of language and religion, the 
applicant states are somewhat closer to the original six in a common 




























































































are the later entering states into the EU. In aspects of popular culture as well, the 
applicant states appear on some dimensions to be nearly as international as the 
sample from the original six. and more internationalist than the sample from the 
later EU entrants. These findings are so counter-intuitive that they demand future 
analysis. Indeed, several members of the “Forward Studies Unit" were so 
incredulous that they discounted the cultural realms that were specified in this 
paper and sought to define other realms (such as sense of rule of law and respect 
for social democratic values) where the divide between East and West would 
come out more strongly. Of course I cannot rule out that in other cultural realms 
the EastAVest divide might be a deep one. But there is no evidence in the wide 
ranging sets of data that went into this paper's analysis that the cultural 
configurations of Eastern Europe pose a threat to the emerging cultural system of 
the current member states.19
The third claim is more of an interpretation than a finding. It is that in 
dynamic national projects (as I believe Europe has become), there is greater 
interest in promoting a national culture in the periphery than in the center. A 
particularly good example of this is to think of middle class Jewish culture in 
post-emancipation Europe:20
The Jews who took the Enlightenment on its word and identified 
emancipation with refinement of manners and. more generally, with self- 
cultivation. had become cultural fanatics. In every Western nation they were the 
ones who treated national cultural heritage most seriously...Trying to excel in the 
complex and often elusive task ahead, they sung the praises of national 
monuments and masterpieces of national art and literature, only to find that the 
audience comprised mostly people similar to themselves. They read avidly and 
voraciously, only to find they could discuss what they read only with other 
aspiring Germans or Frenchmen like themselves. Far from bringing them closer 
to assimilation, conspicuous cultural enthusiasm and obsessive display of cultural 
nobility set them aside from the native middle class and, if anything, supplied 
further evidence of their ineradicable foreignness...The self-destructive tendency 
of assimilation also effected occupations^] legal or medical careers...offered 
particular attractions to assimilating Jews...The unplanned outcome...was...an 
overrepresentation of Jews in the professions, and a new set of arguments to 
prove the Jews' permanent distinctiveness. The abandoning of traditional Jewish 
occupations, which from the assimilants' viewpoint meant Entjudung (de- 
judaization of men as such') appeared to the baffled native public more like the 
process of Verjudung (judaization of heretofore gentile areas)”. [This was a] 




























































































The Eastern Europeans today, in significant numbers, seek to become part 
of a European national culture that is clearer to them than it is to everyday West 
Europeans. To be sure, it might be argued, along lines suggested by Bourdieu. 
that peripheral peoples are “pretenders” with a negative (even cynical) view of 
the center. They could well be emulating the center purely for instrumental gain, 
while in fact they are more nationalistic in their apparent cosmopolitanism.'1 This 
would be more in line with the data presented earlier from Verderv and Osa. The 
fact, however, is that the emulation, in seeking to learn English, in wanting 
secular rule, in listening to "top ten” songs and watching "top ten” films, is not a 
result of an effete class of social climbers (as was perhaps the case with German 
Jews). Rather it is a mass phenomenon, belying a notion of cynical adaptation.
There is yet another important difference. Unlike the situation of post- 
Enlightenment Jewry, however, West Europeans are not seeking to escape from a 
European mold to keep a distance from those seeking to assimilate, so the 
"Catch-22" of the Eastern Europeans becoming "Europeans” w'hile the actual EU 
members becoming something else is not likely. The more likely outcome is that 
the pressures of peripheralization will induce East Europeans to self-consciously 
promote a deepening of a European culture that West Europeans themselves have 
less motivation to foster. Rather than eroding a common EU culture, the data in 
this paper suggest that East European entry into the EU will contribute to its 
deepening.
David D Laitin 
University of Chicago 
Depi. of Political Science 
Pick Hall 522A 













































































































Has an EE 
Language as 
2nd
Original EEC 62.6 29.S •6 35.5 1.7 1
Later 79.1 51.1 1.0 20.0
Member
Applicant 76.0 5.7 9.S 13.6 5.6
Table B
Regression Model with Appropriate Level of Power for Religion in Government as 
Dependent Variable, Comparing Original EEC Members, Later Entrants and Present
Applicants, with Controls
Variable
Dummy for Later Entrant .224098
(12.351)









































































































Mean Levels of Power for Religious Beliefs and Institutions as Appropriate for 
Government (l=low levels of religious influence are appropriate: 5=high levels of 
religious influence are appropriate) and change over generations








Original EEC 2.1438 2.1959 2.0567 .1392
Later Member 2.3309 2.3722 2.2583 .1139
Applicant 2.2424 2.2660 2.2029 .0531
Table D
Correlations between Religious Identification among Family Members (weighted)
Relationship 
Country T ype
R (as child) and 
Mother
R (as child) and 
Father




Original EEC .8322 .6885 .6187 .7301
Later Member .6327 .2159 .1954 .2538
Applicant .3062 .2636 .4010 .7784













































































































Original EEC .6264 .6120 .6244 .7836 ■669S
Later .4486 .4514 .3855 .6780 .2336
Member
Applicant .7953 .7802 .8292 .8545 .0362
Note: These are correlation coefficients based upon my recoded and compressed values based 





























































































The “Top Ten” Films: Selected Countries. Selected Years 
[Figures Represent the Percentage in the Country, for each Year]
[Percentages: Domestic, Other European, and US Films]
Year
Country
1992* 1995 1996 1997
r
ORIGINAL SIX EEC MEMBERS
Germany 10. 0.90 10,0.90 20. 0. 80 30. 20. 50
Netherlands 10. 0.90 20. 0. 80 0. 0. 100 0. 10. 90
France 40, 0. 60 30. 0. 70 40. 0. 60 40. 10. 50
halt 10.0, 90 30. 0. 70 20. 0. 80 30. 20. 50
LATER EC ENTRANTS
Spain 0, 0. 100 0. 0. 100 0.0 . 100 10. 20. 70
United Kingdom 0. 0. 100 0.0, 100 10. 0 .90 20. 0. 80
APPLICANT STATES
Hunsarv 0,0 . 100 0. 0. 100 NA 20. 20, 60
Latvia NA NA 0, 0. 100 10, 10. 80
Poland NA 0. 10. 90 0. 0. 100 30. 10. 60
Slovakia 0. 0. 100 0,0, 100 0, 0. 100 0, 30. 70
Sources: Derek Elley (1996) Variety Movie Guide '97. London, Hamlyn; European 
Commission (1995) Panorama o f EU Industry 95/96, Brussels, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, pp. 27-1 to 27-22: International Motion Picture 
Almanac for years. 1991. 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Screen International Euroguide 


































































































ORIGINAL SIX EEC MEMBERS
Germane 80 15 5
Netherlands 80 10 10
France 35 55 10
Italy 100 0 0
LATER EC ENTRANTS
Spam 70 30 0
United Kingdom 100 (100) 0
APPLICANT STATES
Hungary 70 30 0
Latvia 85 15 0
Poland 70 30 0
Slovakia (1998) 75 15 10
Sources: The 1997 data are from Variety Film Guide International ( 1999), London, Faber and 
Faber, 64-74. The 1999 raw music data were downloaded from:
Germany =  <http://www-info6.informatik.uni-wuerz.hurg.de/~topsi/deu J)40299.htinl>: 
Hungary =  <http://www.extemet.hu/maha.iz/slagerkis.lttm>'.
Latvia =  <http://www. Ianet.lv/news/airplay/l999/990214lv.htnil>:
Holland =  <http://www.radio538.nl/charts/top40.lmnl>:
Poland =  <http://www.radom.top.pl/radio/listaprz.htm>:
Spain =  <http://www.Cadena40.es/scripts/40w3/lst.asp>:
UK = <http://www.dotmusic.com/charts/top20singlesyr_print.asp>:
Italy =  <http://www.televisual.net/telemusic/sp.hnnl>:





























































































Percentage of “Top Twenty" Pop Songs by National Origin by Country and Year
Origin Domestic EU-other US/Canada Other Unknown
Country
ORIGINAL SIX EEC MEMBERS
Germans 25 10 25 0 40
Netherlands 10 15 45 0 30
France 35 5 35 5 20
Italy 0 20 40 0 40
LATER EC ENTRANTS
Spain 25 30 35 10 0
United Kingdom 10 0 55 0 35
APPLICANT STATES
Hungary 35 25 30 0 10
Latvia 15 25 45 0 15
Poland 35 30 35 0 0
Slovakia (1998) 20 30 40 0 10
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'  Here (with italics omitted and other small changes made in the quoted texts) is Kalman 
Kulcsar's characterization of a position that he argues must be overcome to achieve the goal of 
building upon what he considers "the growing awareness of the common elements of 
European culture." See his "East Central Europe and the European Integration" in Mate Szabb 
(ed.) (1996) "The Challenge of Europeanization in the Region: East Central Europe". 
European Studies. 2 (Budapest. Hungarian Political Science Association), quotes from pp. 12- 
lb.
3 The cross country data for language and religion are calculated from surveys conducted by 
the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and the data are supplied by the Zcntralarchiv 
fiir Empirische Sozialforschung. in Koln. Germany, and distributed by the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Ann Arbor. Michigan. USA. While sampling 
procedures differed in each of the countries, the overall attempt was to get country-wide 
stratified samples, with total number of respondents ranging from about 1000 respondents in 
Italy to 2700 in Russia. Full details of the surveys are available from ICPSR at 
^Utp://vv vvvv.icpsr.umich.edu.
^fflavid D. Laitin (1997) “The Cultural Identities of a European State" Politics d  Society. 25. 
"3 (September), pp. 277-302. As I discuss later, the cultural configuration for popular music is 
1 + 1.
3 On language configurations, see Abram de Swaan (1993) “The Evolving European Language 
System: A Theory of Communication Potential and Language Competition". International 
Political Science Review. 14, 3: 241-55.
6 Susan Watkins (1991) From Provinces into Nations. Princeton. Princeton University Press; 
Eugen Weber (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen. Stanford. Stanford University Press; and 
Abram de Swaan (1988) In Care o f the State, New York, Oxford University Press.
7 This is a central argument in Peter Sahlins (1989) Boundaries. Berkeley, University of 
California Press. I develop this theme in Laitin (1997).
8 Maryjane Osa (1992) “Pastoral Mobilization and Symbolic Politics: The Catholic Church in 
Poland, 1918-1966" Ph D. Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago. The 
speculations about the future are on pp. 1-5. Her reference is to Ken Jowitt (1992) New World 
Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley: University of California Press. For a similar 
analysis, see Wodek Anio et al. "Returning to Europe: Central Europe between 
Internationalization and Institutionalization” in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) (1997) Taming 
Power: Germany in Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 200-204. They make the 
excellent point that post-Franco, the Spanish Catholic Church (unlike the Polish Church after 
communism) reconciled itself to Spain's “European vocation”. Thus the challenge for Poland 
to become part of Europe will be more difficult than it was for Spain.
9 Katherine Verdery (1996) “Civil Society or Nation? 'Europe' in the Symbolism of 
Postsocialist Politics", chapter 5 of her What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
10 Verdery, as with Osa, relies upon and has been influenced by Jowitt (1992).




























































































those states to become part of a "Central European" alternative, see Anio et al. (1997). esp. fn. 
1 on p. 195. and pp. 196. 250.
'■ In an article consistent with both Osa and the position taken herein. Ewa Morawska (1995) 
"The Polish Roman Catholic Church Unbound: Change of Face or Change of Context?" in 
Stephen E. Hanson and Willfrted Spohn teds.) Can Europe Work'! Germany and the 
Reconstruction o f Postcommunist Societies. Seattle, University of Washington Press, pp. 47- 
77 argues that the Polish Catholic Church is indeed a bastion of reaction. However, she argues 
that its position in regard to both public and private spheres is one "that the majority of Polish 
society perceives today as detrimental to the satisfactory functioning of the democratic nation- 
state" ip. 48). She concludes that when Poles observe the "naked requirements for a concrete 
Christian ethos . . .  the negative perceptions of the church as 'meddling' and encroaching upon 
people's lives are enhanced" (p. 68). This is very much in line with west European orientations 
toward national churches.
13 As with the religion data, when I report percentages for all cases, or for the set of cases of 
either the original EEC members, the later entrants, or the applicants. I assign a weight to each 
respondent, the same for all respondents in each country, such that there is an equal 
percentage of respondents as a function of the population of the country.
14 The reasoning on Germany is as follows. It would be too early to consider a poll done in 
1991 to reflect East Germany anything but an applicant to the EU. But by 1995, it is fully part 
of a country that was an original member.
L' Data on the film industries of Europe come from the sources cited at the bottom of Table F.
Information on Euroimages has been downloaded from the world wide web. See: 
<http://cullure.coe.fr/Eurimaftes>.
1 The following discussion is based upon the analysis of Simon Frith (1989) “Euro pop"
Cultural Studies. 3. 2. 166-72.
111 A. D. Nock (1933) Conversion. London. Oxford University Press.
14 Perhaps there is a not-so-East set of countries close to the EU norm tthe Visegrad and Baltic 
states) and a "real" East that is far from that norm (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria). My data do not 
allow me to address this possibility, but 1 am skeptical that new data would demonstrate such 
a cultural boundary.
20 Zygmunt Bauman (1988) “Entry Tickets and Exit Visas: Paradoxes of Jewish Identity”, 
Telosy 77:52-55.
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) Distinction : a social critique o f the judgement o f taste, trans. 
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